The rally is being driven by two principal factors. First, investors came to the gradual realization that the trend towards risk aversion had reached extreme proportions. Given that the crisis in the EU has been fairly limited both in scope and extent (at least so far), it made little sense to punish emerging markets. If anything, emerging markets should have been the financial safe havens: “Debt-to-GDP ratios in the developed world are about double those in emerging markets, and they’re growing. This makes emerging markets interesting because you’re picking up incremental spread and in return you’re actually taking less macroeconomic risk.”

Other analysts see a certain futility in targeting a risk-averse strategy: “It’s not that people suddenly think emerging markets are a lot safer, it’s that they’re realising risk is everywhere and they can’t just assume the developed world is safe.” In other words, some investors are wondering whether it doesn’t make sense to focus less on risk – which  has become increasingly random – and more on return. In this aspect, emerging market investments of all kinds are more attractive than their counterparts in the developed world.

The second source of momentum for the rally is a long-term shift in capital allocation. Thanks to foreign demand, Emerging Market “borrowers, including governments and companies, have raised almost $300bn (£200bn) to date, up 10 per cent on the same period in 2009.” A microcosm of this surge can be seen in US mutual funds: “Emerging market equity funds…posted combined inflows of more than $3 billion for the week ended July 14, while emerging market bond funds took in $745 million, bringing their year-to-date inflows to an all-time high of $18.5 billion.”

Across all sectors, money is pouring into emerging markets at an even faster pace than before the credit crisis. This time around, however, analysts argue that it is justified by fundamentals: “Economies in the developing world are slated to grow 6.3% this year and are expected to maintain a similar growth rate through 2013, according to the International Monetary Fund. Advanced economies are seen expanding around 2.4% annually over the same time period.” The Brazilian economy alone expanded at an annualized rate of 9% in 2010 Q1, the fastest rate in 15 years!

Emerging market investors share the confidence of foreign investors, and it seems the flow of funds will primarily be one-way. According to a recent survey, “Just 19 per cent of Brazilians, 15 per cent of Indians and 11 per cent of Chinese…said they anticipated increasing cross-border investment.”

At this point, the only thing that could derail emerging markets is if investors get too ahead of themselves. According to Citigroup, “Developing-nation shares will rally 20 percent to 25 percent by the end of this year as the world economy avoids a double-dip recession and attractive valuations lure investors.” That would bring share prices past the current level and dangerously close to the pre-credit crisis highs of 2008. The JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) has already shattered its previous record, and given the current spread of only 300 basis points to US Treasuries (which themselves are trading near all-time lows), one has to wonder if investors aren’t at risk of re-entering bubble territory.

If for whatever reason investors get spooked, it could spark the same capital flight that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, in which emerging market and commodity currencies alike fell 30-50% over a duration of mere months. While no one is predicting a similar outcome this time around, I think prudence and caution are nonetheless advisable.

As to what’s propelling the Yen higher, there is very little mystery. Two words: Safe Haven. “The yen’s attractions lie in its status as a haven from the turmoil that has engulfed financial markets as, first, the eurozone debt crisis unfolded and, then, fears about a double-dip recession have intensified.” To be sure, there are a handful of currencies that are arguably more secure and less risky than the Yen. The problem is that with the exception of the Dollar, none of them can compete with the Yen on the basis of liquidity. In addition, thanks to non-existent inflation in Japan and low interest rates in other countries, there is very little opportunity cost in simply holding Yen and simply taking a wait-and-see approach.

According to some analysts, interest rate differentials will probably remain narrow for the foreseeable future: “Global bond yields will fall, reducing the incentive of yen-based investors to place funds abroad.” In fact, thanks to low interest rate differentials, the Yen is not even the target funding currency for carry traders. Suffice it to say that investors are not bothered by the fact that Japanese monetary policy is extraordinarily accommodative and that Japanese long-term interest rates are the lowest in the world. For those who are concerned about rising interest rate differentials, consider that this probably won’t become a factor until the medium-term.

On the fundamental front, there are a couple of risks for the Yen. First of all, there is the stalled Japanese economic recovery and the possibility that the strong Yen could further erode the competitiveness of Japan’s export sector, the mainstay of its economy. Yen bulls respond to this by noting both that Japan’s economic recovery has already stalled for 25 years and that should the Yen’s rise actually crimp economic growth, the Central Bank would probably intervene. By all accounts, “The government will continue to keep a close eye on the yen.”

A greater concern, perhaps, is Japan’s massive debt. Near $10 Trillion, public debt is already 180% of GDP, and is projected to grow to 200% over the next few years. Total public and private debt, meanwhile, is by far the highest in the world, at 380% of GDP. The Japanese government is planning to implement “austerity measures,” but political stalemate and election pressures will make this difficult to achieve.  All three of the rating agencies have issued stern warnings, and downgrades could soon follow. Here, Yen bulls retort that as unsustainable as this debt might appear, the majority (90%) of it is financed domestically, through the massive pool of savings. The remaining 10% is eagerly soaked up by foreign investors, who view the debt as a more attractive alternative to cash and stocks. [This is the great irony that I alluded to in the title of this post - that more debt is viewed positively as "liquidity" and does nothing to hurt the Yen].

Speaking of which, the Japanese stock market has risen by only 5% this year, and some analysts are predicting that a long bull market is inevitable. Adding to the fervor, Central Banks have begun to build their positions in the Yen, for the first time in 10 years. It seems everyone is excited about the Yen, even economists: “Within the developed economy space, Japan looks relatively good as an economy that’s likely to be growing faster than Europe or America, and it’s generally considered to have low risk of capital flight.” In other words, the consensus is that there is a very low chance of a “Greek-like debt crisis.”

At this point, the Yen can only be toppled by Central Banks: either foreign Central Banks will hike interest rates and make the Yen unattractive in contrast, or the Bank of Japan will intervene directly to prevent it from rising further.

This might seem ridiculous, given the Dollar’s amazing performance of late. It has appreciated healthily against almost all of the world’s major currencies, and is also more valuable on a trade-weighted basis. Bear in mind, however, that this rise is entirely a function of the (perceived) crisis in Europe. It speaks not to any strength in the Dollar, but rather to weakness in other currencies. In fact, as I wrote earlier this week (”US Dollar Paradigm Shift“), as investors have returned their gaze to the fundamentals, the Dollar has suffered.

Without drilling into the nuts and bolts of US fiscal policy, consider that the US budget deficit will exceed an unthinkable $1 Trillion for a second year in a row. The national debt is now growing much faster than GDP, and servicing it is consuming an ever-increasing share of the budget. With concerns looming of a double-dip recession, meanwhile, tax revenues will probably stagnate, even regardless of what happens to spending. In short, US budget deficits are going to continue to be a fact of life for the immediate future.

Monetary Policy is equally disastrous. The Fed is pre-occupied with keeping interest rates low and with promoting an economic recovery. $2 Trillion of newly-minted money is still flowing through the system, and it’s unclear when it will be siphoned out. There are a few inflation hawks on the Fed’s Board of Governors, but they lack the power to effect a short-term change in monetary policy.

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), G20, and a pair of economists, among others, have all sounded alarm bells, calling such policies foolish and unsustainable. According to the BIS, “Keeping interest rates very low comes at a cost—a cost that is growing with time. Experience teaches us that prolonged periods of unusually low rates cloud assessments of financial risks, induce a search for yield and delay balance-sheet adjustments.”

In short, there is a clear consensus that perennial budget deficits and low rates are wrongheaded at best, and disastrous at worst. From the standpoint of currency markets, what matters in the short-term are interest rates, and what matters in the long-term is inflation. The Dollar is in an unfavorable position on both fronts. Interest rates are currently near 0% – the lowest in the world – and easy monetary policy and high government debt increase the likelihood of inflation in the wrong-term.

In light of this notion, the only logical conclusion is that the Dollar simply plays no role in the formulation of government and Central Bank decision-making. Since the inception of the credit crisis, this was a luxury that could be afforded, as safe-haven capital poured into the US. If/when the crisis abates, this capital will probably depart, as investors are forced to consider the fundamentals.

Still, the SNB should be applauded for its efforts. As you can see from the chart above, it managed to keep the Franc from rising above €1.50 (its so-called line in the sand) for the better part of 2009. Furthermore, by most accounts, it managed to slow the Franc’s unavoidable descent against the Euro in 2010. While the Dollar has appreciated more than 15% against the Euro, the Franc has a risen by a more modest 10%. ” ‘Without that €90 billion [intervention], it’s fair to say that the euro would be closer to $1.10,’ ” argued one analyst. In fact, as recently as May 18, the SNB manifested its power in the form of 1-day, 2% decline in the Franc, its sharpest fall in more than a year.

Overall, the SNB has spent more than $200 Billion over the last 12 months, including $73 Billion in the month of May alone. ” ‘To put the figures in perspective, there have been only two months when China, the world’s largest holder of forex reserves with $2,249bn in assets, saw its reserves increase more.’ ” The SNB now claims the world’s 7th largest foreign exchange reserves, ahead of the perennial interveners of Brazil in Hong Kong, the latter of whose currency is pegged against the Dollar.

While the SNB can take some credit for halting the decline in the Franc, it was ultimately done in by factors beyond its control, namely the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and consequent surge in risk aversion. At this point the forces that the SNB is battling against are too large to be contained: “We’re talking about a massive euro crisis, so no single central bank can prop it up on its own,” summarized one trader. As a result, the Franc is now rising to a fresh record high against the Euro nearly every trading session.

Still, the SNB remains committed to rhetorical intervention. “The central bank has a ‘clear aim‘ to maintain price stability and this is what guides its policy actions, SNB President Philipp Hildebrand said…The bank will act in a ‘decisive manner if needed.’ ” That means that if economic growth slows and/or deflation sets it, it may have to restart the printing presses. Given that its economy is slated to grow at a solid 1.5% this year, unemployment is a meager 3.8%, and the threat of inflation has largely abated. On the other hand, the prospect of a drawn-out crisis in the EU means the Franc will probably continue to appreciate – without help from the Central Bank: ” ‘The SNB may continue to intervene in the currency markets until 2020,’ ” declared the head of forex research for UBS.

The implications for currency markets are interesting. Not only has the SNB prevented the Euro from falling too fast against the Franc, but it may also have prevented it from falling too quickly against other currencies. ” ‘To suggest that the SNB has been the savior of the euro is too much. But one could imagine that if the euro starts to decline again, the market may blame the fact that the SNB isn’t buying,’ ” said a currency strategist from Standard Bank.

This episode is also a testament to the limits of intervention. It has always been clear (to this blogger, at least) that intervention is futile in the long-term. The best that a Central Bank can hope for is to stall a particular outcome long enough in order to achieve a certain short-term policy aim. When enough momentum coalesces behind a (floating) currency, there is nothing that a Central Bank can do to stop it from moving to the rate that investors collectively deem it to be worth.

We’re all familiar with the arguments attacking the Yuan in this context: its currency is pegged, its capital controls are rigid, and its capital markets are shallow and illiquid. Say what you want about the world’s major currencies (volatile, debt-ridden, etc.), but at least none of these factors applies, goes this line of thinking. With the Euro’s future up in the air, however, a potential hole has been created in Central Banks’ respective forex reserves. As replacement(s) for the Euro are sought, such long-held assumptions are being challenged.

The Chinese Yuan is attractive for a number of reasons. First, investors and Central Banks want exposure to China’s economy; its average annual growth rate of 10% over the last 30 years is far-and-away the highest in the world. “China’s economic output will be more than $5 trillion, or around 9% of the world’s economy, according to the International Monetary Fund.” Second, the fact that the RMB is fixed is in some ways a perk: the wild fluctuations that most currencies witnessed as a result of the credit crisis has made some wonder if market-determined exchange rates aren’t overrated. Finally, the widespread consensus is that the RMB will appreciate anyway, so holding it seems like a safe bet.

Therefore, “Central banks or sovereign wealth funds from Malaysia, Norway and Singapore have received special quotas from the Chinese government to allow them to gain a bit of exposure to China’s currency. The bet is that holding yuan-denominated assets is an important feature of a diversified national reserve.” In addition, China has signed Yuan-denominated swap agreements with a handful of its most important trade partners, totaling $100 Billion over the last year.

Still, these are small-scale agreements, and Central Banks are really just testing the waters. According to a recent study by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), “The Chinese yuan is ‘far from ready’ to gain reserve currency status. Rather, it said China’s yuan was likely first to become a regional currency as trade links with its neighbours expand.” The main issue is not one of stability, but rather of supply. Simply, there are not enough liquid, attractive investments, denominated in RMB. China’s stock and bond markets are filled with unreliable companies, whose primary loyalty is to the State, rather than to investors. Buying Chinese government bonds seems like a safe option, but given, that China finances most of its spending with cash, such bonds are not widely available.

For now, the Chinese Yuan will remain most attractive (from the standpoint of a reserve currency) to regional trade partners, because such countries have a genuine use for RMB. Investors seem to understand this idea, and are using the currencies of such countries to bet indirectly on the RMB. According to one analyst, “On days when trading is especially volatile, the Singapore dollar moves in tandem with the yuan bets. The Malaysian ringgit, Taiwanese dollar and Korean won are also high on the list of currencies affected by the yuan.” In short, the RBI’s assessment of the Yuan seems pretty apt. It will probably be at least a decade before holding the Yuan is as viable (not to say attractive) as the Japanese Yen. For investors who don’t want to wait that long, there are a handful of other regional currencies that they can hold in the interim.