The spike in volatility was easy enough to understand. Basically, the possibility of a default by a member of the EU or even worse, a breakup of the Euro created massive uncertainty in the markets, spurring the flow of capital from regions and assets perceived as risky to those perceived as safe havens. As you can see from the chart below, this trend has begun to reverse itself, but still remains prone to sudden spikes.

While the crisis in the EU seems to have (temporarily) settled, investors are attuned to the possibility that it could flare up again at any moment. A failed bond issue, a higher-than-forecast budget deficit, political stalemate, labor strikes – all signal a failure to resolve the crisis, and would surely trigger a renewed upswing in volatility and sell-off in risky assets.

The same goes for (unforeseen) crises in other regions, affecting other currencies. Muses one analyst: “Next week? Who knows. One strong candidate is for flight out of the yen as investors start to fear there won’t be enough domestic demand for mountains of Japanese debt and foreign buyers will insist on much higher yields. Another might be that Swiss banking exposure to insolvent east European households causes another banking crisis.” Don’t forget about the UK and US, both of which have hardly put the recession behind them, and whose Trillions in debt represent powder kegs waiting to explode.

It will be months or years before these latent crises even begin to manifest themselves, let alone achieve some kind of resolution. As a result, many analysts predict that volatility will remain high for the foreseeable future: “Big and sudden currency market moves shouldn’t come as a surprise, whatever the direction…Higher market volatility should follow on from greater macroeconomic volatility. Increased economic fluctuations increase uncertainty. And there’s no question macroeconomic volatility has risen.”

In addition, there is no way for governments for Central Banks to alleviate these crises due to the “Trillema of International Finance.” Greg Mankiw, Harvard Economics Professors, explains that in prioritizing an independent monetary policy and open capital markets have forced many countries to forgo exchange rate stability: “Any American can easily invest abroad…and foreigners are free to buy stocks and bonds on domestic exchanges. Moreover, the Federal Reserve sets monetary policy to try to maintain full employment and price stability. But a result of this decision is volatility in the value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets.” While the Euro has eliminated exchange rate fluctuations between members of the Eurozone, meanwhile, there is nothing that the ECB can (or desires to) do to minimize volatility between the Euro and outside currencies.

From the standpoint of forex strategy, there are a couple of lessons that can be learned. First of all, the carry trade will remain underground until volatility returns to more attractive levels. Until then, the potential gains from earning a positive yield spread will be offset by the possibility of sudden, irascible currency depreciation. Second, growth currencies – despite boasting strong fundamentals – will remain vulnerable to sudden declines. That doesn’t mean that they should be avoided; rather, you should simply be aware that small corrections could easily turn into multi-month weakness.

The rally is being driven by two principal factors. First, investors came to the gradual realization that the trend towards risk aversion had reached extreme proportions. Given that the crisis in the EU has been fairly limited both in scope and extent (at least so far), it made little sense to punish emerging markets. If anything, emerging markets should have been the financial safe havens: “Debt-to-GDP ratios in the developed world are about double those in emerging markets, and they’re growing. This makes emerging markets interesting because you’re picking up incremental spread and in return you’re actually taking less macroeconomic risk.”

Other analysts see a certain futility in targeting a risk-averse strategy: “It’s not that people suddenly think emerging markets are a lot safer, it’s that they’re realising risk is everywhere and they can’t just assume the developed world is safe.” In other words, some investors are wondering whether it doesn’t make sense to focus less on risk – which  has become increasingly random – and more on return. In this aspect, emerging market investments of all kinds are more attractive than their counterparts in the developed world.

The second source of momentum for the rally is a long-term shift in capital allocation. Thanks to foreign demand, Emerging Market “borrowers, including governments and companies, have raised almost $300bn (£200bn) to date, up 10 per cent on the same period in 2009.” A microcosm of this surge can be seen in US mutual funds: “Emerging market equity funds…posted combined inflows of more than $3 billion for the week ended July 14, while emerging market bond funds took in $745 million, bringing their year-to-date inflows to an all-time high of $18.5 billion.”

Across all sectors, money is pouring into emerging markets at an even faster pace than before the credit crisis. This time around, however, analysts argue that it is justified by fundamentals: “Economies in the developing world are slated to grow 6.3% this year and are expected to maintain a similar growth rate through 2013, according to the International Monetary Fund. Advanced economies are seen expanding around 2.4% annually over the same time period.” The Brazilian economy alone expanded at an annualized rate of 9% in 2010 Q1, the fastest rate in 15 years!

Emerging market investors share the confidence of foreign investors, and it seems the flow of funds will primarily be one-way. According to a recent survey, “Just 19 per cent of Brazilians, 15 per cent of Indians and 11 per cent of Chinese…said they anticipated increasing cross-border investment.”

At this point, the only thing that could derail emerging markets is if investors get too ahead of themselves. According to Citigroup, “Developing-nation shares will rally 20 percent to 25 percent by the end of this year as the world economy avoids a double-dip recession and attractive valuations lure investors.” That would bring share prices past the current level and dangerously close to the pre-credit crisis highs of 2008. The JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) has already shattered its previous record, and given the current spread of only 300 basis points to US Treasuries (which themselves are trading near all-time lows), one has to wonder if investors aren’t at risk of re-entering bubble territory.

If for whatever reason investors get spooked, it could spark the same capital flight that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, in which emerging market and commodity currencies alike fell 30-50% over a duration of mere months. While no one is predicting a similar outcome this time around, I think prudence and caution are nonetheless advisable.

Analysts attribute the Yen’s resilience to a series of aberrant developments, rather than to some kind of cohesive trend. Above all, there is the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, which has directed a steady stream of risk-averse capital to Japan. Under the existing paradigm, the US, Japan, Switzerland, a handful of other economies are still thought of as financial safe havens, a notion which serves to explain the Yen’s surge to a 10-year high against the Euro.

This is not exclusively a one-way trend. On the contrary, there is a constant ebb and flow in risk-tolerance as investors weigh the seriousness of the EU debt debacle and other crises. In fact, some believe that the recent uptick in risk aversion is already in decline: “Once investors shift their attention back to the fundamentals, which are still signaling solid improvement, there is no strong reason to buy the yen. Underlying demand for higher-yielding assets outside Japan remains strong.”

Outside of this, there is also some debate as to what constitutes a safe-haven currency, and whether the Yen qualifies. On the one hand, Japanese interest rates are extremely low and monetary policy remains accommodative. It’s capital markets are deep (though not exactly buoyant), and for investors that value capital preservation, Japan would seem like a reasonable choice. On the other hand, this mentality is facing a backlash as a result of prolonged political uncertainty. Since unseating the Liberal Democratic Party in 2009 – an historic achievement – the Democratic Party has been in a dither and implemented no new, meaningful policies. The finance minister was replaced a few months ago, and to top it off, the Prime Minister himself is set to resign.

It is both the uncertainty – the perennial enemy of the carry trade – and the potential replacement which worries investors and currency traders. The current front-runner, Finance Minister Naoto Kan, has not made a secret of his desire for a weak Yen: “Markets in principle should determine foreign exchange rates, but I think we must closely watch [markets] and ensure that there won’t be any excessive yen rises.” As Prime Minister, he would probably be more aggressive than his predecessor in intervening in currency markets, if need be.

Perhaps with Mr. Kan’s support, the Central Bank of Japan recently announced that it would inject $20 Billion into capital markets as part of of an effort to “calm” the financial markets. The Central Bank is apparently committed to “combating deflation,” which in some circles is code for currency devaluation.

In short, the only real question – posed in the title of this post – is the exchange rate that the Japanese leadership is targeting. Currency valuation is always more art than science, so it’s unclear not only the rate that in reality is fair, but also the rate that Japan perceives as fair. My feeling is that it’s north of 95 Yen/Dollar. It seems that anything between 90 and 95 is acceptable, while a drop below 90 is cause for intervention. For now, that intervention has been entirely vocal; if the government’s approval ratings remain in the basement, however, it could turn into actual intervention.

The credit crisis was initially marked by a collapse in trade and an exodus of capital from Asia, as western consumers tightened their wallets and investors flocked to so-called safe havens. As developing countries fought off currency depreciation, forex reserve levels plummeted. Less than a year later, trade has already picked back up, investors have returned en masse to emerging markets, and Central Banks are once again sterilizing capital inflows so as to mitigate upward pressure on their respective currencies. [Chart Below courtesy of Council of Foreign Relations.]

“Taiwan and Thailand, the most aggressive in defending the U.S. currency, have logged record-high reserves every month since December.” Japan, whose reserves are the second highest in the world (after China), is the lone holdout. As the Forex Blog reported yesterday, the newly elected Democratic Party of Japan will pursue an economic policy that depends less on exports, and has pledged to stay out of the forex markets.

The prospects for further reserve accumulation remain reasonably bright, as emerging markets lead the global economy towards recovery. “The outlook for key Asian economies is improving faster than that of developed economies. For the time being, this should accelerate flows into these markets, making it harder for central banks to keep their currencies in check.”

While China’s economy is no exception, its nascent recovery is being driven by capital investment, government spending, and (ultimately?) consumer spending. As a result, it is forecast that “China’s current-account surplus will fall to under 6% of GDP this year and 4% in 2010, down from a peak of 11% in 2007. Exports amounted to 35% of GDP in 2007; this year…that ratio will drop to 24.5%.” If such an outcome obtains, it will almost certainly lead to a slower accumulation of reserves.

While this is all well and good, the more important question for most (forex) analysts is how these reserves are being held. The vast majority of these reserves are still denominated in US Dollar assets, and in fact, the proportion may have risen slightly since the beginning of the credit crisis. Asian Central Banks are particularly biased towards the Dollar, which accounts for 70% of their reserves, compared to the worldwide Central Bank average of 64%.

Moreover, it doesn’t look like plans are afoot to change this trend anytime soon. China has maintained its push (though less vocally) to turn the Chinese Yuan into a global reserve currency, declaring that its capital markets and currency controls will open accordingly to facilitate such. It is in preliminary talks with Thailand for yet another currency swap agreement, to supplement the $95 Billion in such deals signed since December. For its part, the Bank of Thailand has insisted that the Yuan is not even close to challenging the supremacy of the Dollar: “You have to accept that the dollar is going to be a reserve currency for quite some time. You don’t have any alternatives.”

Even China, despite its rhetoric, remains committed to the Dollar. The only talk of diversification in Chinese investment circles is in regards to what kinds of US assets they should invest in, not whether they should be invested in the US or somewhere else. Said the manager of China Investment Corp, which has a mandate to invest nearly $300 Billion of China’s FX reserves, “The risk of a decline in the dollar risks was more of a national issue for China than for CIC because its capital is in dollars.”

This last quote inadvertently confirms that the role of the Dollar as the world’s reserve currency is being treated as a political issue, when in fact it is a financial economic issue. In other words, while many countries want to limit the influence of the US by limiting the power of the Dollar, their Central Banks are stuck with it because it remains the most practical, and advantageous option. Dumping it would be akin to punishing themselves.