The stress tests were first proposed last month as a way to gauge the health of the EU banking sector; it was hoped that the results would demonstrate the soundness of the banking system and mollify investors. Since then, momentum continued to build in the markets, as investors engaged in meta-speculation about the potential impact of the stress tests.

In the days leading up to the test, there was a mixture of apprehension and uncertainty. One trader warned: “No one seems to want to hold too much risk heading into the release of the European bank stress tests….A great deal of caution should be exercised…as the results of the stress tests are made public. There is definitely the potential for a huge swing in either direction…as there could be a freight train coming down the tracks.” The Euro traded sideways, capping an impressive 8% rally that began in June.

On Monday, the tests were finally conducted: “EU regulators scrutinized 91 of the bloc’s banks to assess whether they have enough capital to withstand a recession and sovereign-debt crisis, with a Tier 1 capital ratio of 6 percent as a floor. Regulators tested portfolios of sovereign five-year bonds, assuming a loss of 23.1 percent on Greek debt, 12.3 percent on Spanish bonds, 14 percent on Portuguese bonds and 4.7 percent on German state debt.” Officially, only 7 banks failed the tests – 5 in Spain, 1 in Germany, 1 in Greece – with a combined capital shortfall of €3.5 Billion.

When the news was initially released, the Euro sea-sawed – first rising, then falling – and analysts rushed to ascribe sometimes-contradicting sentiments. First, there was “concern,” then came “relief.” From where I was sitting, the markets’ reaction was basically somewhere between a shrug and a yawn. First of all, investors saw the tests for the charade that they essentially were. The only reason that EU regulators were willing to conduct them publicly was because they knew that the results would be positive. As I wrote above, it was intended in advance that the tests would “mollify investors.”

On a related note, the tests were not nearly strict enough: “Analysts were instantly dismissive of the tests, saying the bar was too low. ‘The prospect of an outright sovereign default, which is what has worried markets most, has not even been considered.’ “  Instead of examining the possibility of bonds becoming worthless and irredeemable, the tests only assumed modest losses.” By this standard, argue investors, it’s no wonder that virtually every bank was able to pass.

Ultimately, gauging the success of the stress tests will require waiting few weeks. Unlike currency, stock, and bond markets – which can and did offer instant feedback on the news – it will probably take some time before the impact is fully reflected in the money markets. In other words, while an uptick in the Euro, shares of bank stocks, and sovereign bond prices should all be seen as symbols of confidence, the real test is whether investors will be willing to lend directly to banks, at reasonable rates (proxied by 3-month Euro LIBOR, on display below).

In fact, that test could come quite soon, as the ECB continues to recall the hundreds of Billions of Euros in loans that it made to commercial banks. If LIBOR rates remain steady and the markets remain liquid, then the stress tests can be called a success. If private investors balk and/or the ECB is forced to extend its lending program, however, the tests will be seen in hindsight as a waste of time.

The spike in volatility was easy enough to understand. Basically, the possibility of a default by a member of the EU or even worse, a breakup of the Euro created massive uncertainty in the markets, spurring the flow of capital from regions and assets perceived as risky to those perceived as safe havens. As you can see from the chart below, this trend has begun to reverse itself, but still remains prone to sudden spikes.

While the crisis in the EU seems to have (temporarily) settled, investors are attuned to the possibility that it could flare up again at any moment. A failed bond issue, a higher-than-forecast budget deficit, political stalemate, labor strikes – all signal a failure to resolve the crisis, and would surely trigger a renewed upswing in volatility and sell-off in risky assets.

The same goes for (unforeseen) crises in other regions, affecting other currencies. Muses one analyst: “Next week? Who knows. One strong candidate is for flight out of the yen as investors start to fear there won’t be enough domestic demand for mountains of Japanese debt and foreign buyers will insist on much higher yields. Another might be that Swiss banking exposure to insolvent east European households causes another banking crisis.” Don’t forget about the UK and US, both of which have hardly put the recession behind them, and whose Trillions in debt represent powder kegs waiting to explode.

It will be months or years before these latent crises even begin to manifest themselves, let alone achieve some kind of resolution. As a result, many analysts predict that volatility will remain high for the foreseeable future: “Big and sudden currency market moves shouldn’t come as a surprise, whatever the direction…Higher market volatility should follow on from greater macroeconomic volatility. Increased economic fluctuations increase uncertainty. And there’s no question macroeconomic volatility has risen.”

In addition, there is no way for governments for Central Banks to alleviate these crises due to the “Trillema of International Finance.” Greg Mankiw, Harvard Economics Professors, explains that in prioritizing an independent monetary policy and open capital markets have forced many countries to forgo exchange rate stability: “Any American can easily invest abroad…and foreigners are free to buy stocks and bonds on domestic exchanges. Moreover, the Federal Reserve sets monetary policy to try to maintain full employment and price stability. But a result of this decision is volatility in the value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets.” While the Euro has eliminated exchange rate fluctuations between members of the Eurozone, meanwhile, there is nothing that the ECB can (or desires to) do to minimize volatility between the Euro and outside currencies.

From the standpoint of forex strategy, there are a couple of lessons that can be learned. First of all, the carry trade will remain underground until volatility returns to more attractive levels. Until then, the potential gains from earning a positive yield spread will be offset by the possibility of sudden, irascible currency depreciation. Second, growth currencies – despite boasting strong fundamentals – will remain vulnerable to sudden declines. That doesn’t mean that they should be avoided; rather, you should simply be aware that small corrections could easily turn into multi-month weakness.

The rally is being driven by two principal factors. First, investors came to the gradual realization that the trend towards risk aversion had reached extreme proportions. Given that the crisis in the EU has been fairly limited both in scope and extent (at least so far), it made little sense to punish emerging markets. If anything, emerging markets should have been the financial safe havens: “Debt-to-GDP ratios in the developed world are about double those in emerging markets, and they’re growing. This makes emerging markets interesting because you’re picking up incremental spread and in return you’re actually taking less macroeconomic risk.”

Other analysts see a certain futility in targeting a risk-averse strategy: “It’s not that people suddenly think emerging markets are a lot safer, it’s that they’re realising risk is everywhere and they can’t just assume the developed world is safe.” In other words, some investors are wondering whether it doesn’t make sense to focus less on risk – which  has become increasingly random – and more on return. In this aspect, emerging market investments of all kinds are more attractive than their counterparts in the developed world.

The second source of momentum for the rally is a long-term shift in capital allocation. Thanks to foreign demand, Emerging Market “borrowers, including governments and companies, have raised almost $300bn (£200bn) to date, up 10 per cent on the same period in 2009.” A microcosm of this surge can be seen in US mutual funds: “Emerging market equity funds…posted combined inflows of more than $3 billion for the week ended July 14, while emerging market bond funds took in $745 million, bringing their year-to-date inflows to an all-time high of $18.5 billion.”

Across all sectors, money is pouring into emerging markets at an even faster pace than before the credit crisis. This time around, however, analysts argue that it is justified by fundamentals: “Economies in the developing world are slated to grow 6.3% this year and are expected to maintain a similar growth rate through 2013, according to the International Monetary Fund. Advanced economies are seen expanding around 2.4% annually over the same time period.” The Brazilian economy alone expanded at an annualized rate of 9% in 2010 Q1, the fastest rate in 15 years!

Emerging market investors share the confidence of foreign investors, and it seems the flow of funds will primarily be one-way. According to a recent survey, “Just 19 per cent of Brazilians, 15 per cent of Indians and 11 per cent of Chinese…said they anticipated increasing cross-border investment.”

At this point, the only thing that could derail emerging markets is if investors get too ahead of themselves. According to Citigroup, “Developing-nation shares will rally 20 percent to 25 percent by the end of this year as the world economy avoids a double-dip recession and attractive valuations lure investors.” That would bring share prices past the current level and dangerously close to the pre-credit crisis highs of 2008. The JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) has already shattered its previous record, and given the current spread of only 300 basis points to US Treasuries (which themselves are trading near all-time lows), one has to wonder if investors aren’t at risk of re-entering bubble territory.

If for whatever reason investors get spooked, it could spark the same capital flight that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, in which emerging market and commodity currencies alike fell 30-50% over a duration of mere months. While no one is predicting a similar outcome this time around, I think prudence and caution are nonetheless advisable.

This might seem ridiculous, given the Dollar’s amazing performance of late. It has appreciated healthily against almost all of the world’s major currencies, and is also more valuable on a trade-weighted basis. Bear in mind, however, that this rise is entirely a function of the (perceived) crisis in Europe. It speaks not to any strength in the Dollar, but rather to weakness in other currencies. In fact, as I wrote earlier this week (”US Dollar Paradigm Shift“), as investors have returned their gaze to the fundamentals, the Dollar has suffered.

Without drilling into the nuts and bolts of US fiscal policy, consider that the US budget deficit will exceed an unthinkable $1 Trillion for a second year in a row. The national debt is now growing much faster than GDP, and servicing it is consuming an ever-increasing share of the budget. With concerns looming of a double-dip recession, meanwhile, tax revenues will probably stagnate, even regardless of what happens to spending. In short, US budget deficits are going to continue to be a fact of life for the immediate future.

Monetary Policy is equally disastrous. The Fed is pre-occupied with keeping interest rates low and with promoting an economic recovery. $2 Trillion of newly-minted money is still flowing through the system, and it’s unclear when it will be siphoned out. There are a few inflation hawks on the Fed’s Board of Governors, but they lack the power to effect a short-term change in monetary policy.

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), G20, and a pair of economists, among others, have all sounded alarm bells, calling such policies foolish and unsustainable. According to the BIS, “Keeping interest rates very low comes at a cost—a cost that is growing with time. Experience teaches us that prolonged periods of unusually low rates cloud assessments of financial risks, induce a search for yield and delay balance-sheet adjustments.”

In short, there is a clear consensus that perennial budget deficits and low rates are wrongheaded at best, and disastrous at worst. From the standpoint of currency markets, what matters in the short-term are interest rates, and what matters in the long-term is inflation. The Dollar is in an unfavorable position on both fronts. Interest rates are currently near 0% – the lowest in the world – and easy monetary policy and high government debt increase the likelihood of inflation in the wrong-term.

In light of this notion, the only logical conclusion is that the Dollar simply plays no role in the formulation of government and Central Bank decision-making. Since the inception of the credit crisis, this was a luxury that could be afforded, as safe-haven capital poured into the US. If/when the crisis abates, this capital will probably depart, as investors are forced to consider the fundamentals.

Analysts attribute the Yen’s resilience to a series of aberrant developments, rather than to some kind of cohesive trend. Above all, there is the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, which has directed a steady stream of risk-averse capital to Japan. Under the existing paradigm, the US, Japan, Switzerland, a handful of other economies are still thought of as financial safe havens, a notion which serves to explain the Yen’s surge to a 10-year high against the Euro.

This is not exclusively a one-way trend. On the contrary, there is a constant ebb and flow in risk-tolerance as investors weigh the seriousness of the EU debt debacle and other crises. In fact, some believe that the recent uptick in risk aversion is already in decline: “Once investors shift their attention back to the fundamentals, which are still signaling solid improvement, there is no strong reason to buy the yen. Underlying demand for higher-yielding assets outside Japan remains strong.”

Outside of this, there is also some debate as to what constitutes a safe-haven currency, and whether the Yen qualifies. On the one hand, Japanese interest rates are extremely low and monetary policy remains accommodative. It’s capital markets are deep (though not exactly buoyant), and for investors that value capital preservation, Japan would seem like a reasonable choice. On the other hand, this mentality is facing a backlash as a result of prolonged political uncertainty. Since unseating the Liberal Democratic Party in 2009 – an historic achievement – the Democratic Party has been in a dither and implemented no new, meaningful policies. The finance minister was replaced a few months ago, and to top it off, the Prime Minister himself is set to resign.

It is both the uncertainty – the perennial enemy of the carry trade – and the potential replacement which worries investors and currency traders. The current front-runner, Finance Minister Naoto Kan, has not made a secret of his desire for a weak Yen: “Markets in principle should determine foreign exchange rates, but I think we must closely watch [markets] and ensure that there won’t be any excessive yen rises.” As Prime Minister, he would probably be more aggressive than his predecessor in intervening in currency markets, if need be.

Perhaps with Mr. Kan’s support, the Central Bank of Japan recently announced that it would inject $20 Billion into capital markets as part of of an effort to “calm” the financial markets. The Central Bank is apparently committed to “combating deflation,” which in some circles is code for currency devaluation.

In short, the only real question – posed in the title of this post – is the exchange rate that the Japanese leadership is targeting. Currency valuation is always more art than science, so it’s unclear not only the rate that in reality is fair, but also the rate that Japan perceives as fair. My feeling is that it’s north of 95 Yen/Dollar. It seems that anything between 90 and 95 is acceptable, while a drop below 90 is cause for intervention. For now, that intervention has been entirely vocal; if the government’s approval ratings remain in the basement, however, it could turn into actual intervention.